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Common Law and Civil Law as Pro-Market 
Adaptations 
Benito Arruñada*  
Veneta Andonova** 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Contrary to some naïve liberal perspectives, the proper 
functioning of a market economy requires that freedom of contract be 
protected effectively, a protection that can be achieved in different 
ways. A major design decision concerns the rule-making discretion 
that the principal, be it a sovereign or a parliament, delegates to the 
courts. When making this decision, the designer should take into 
account the specialization advantages and transaction costs that come 
with more or less specialized rule-making. Factors influencing this 
trade-off explain the different solutions adopted in the two main legal 
traditions of the West. The common law tradition evolved keeping 
more rule-making powers in the judiciary, and thus was characterized 
by unspecialized rule-making. The civil law tradition, on the 
contrary, was purposely transformed during the 19th century, 
reserving greater rule-making power to the legislative branch and 
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thus reducing the discretion that judges had enjoyed during the 
Ancient Regime, discretion that was mostly retained in the common 
law.  
By stressing this difference, some recent studies claim that 
common law legal systems provide superior solutions compared to 
those developed in the civil law tradition, in which judges have less 
rule-making powers.1 This Article criticizes these claims by 
developing and examining an alternative hypothesis, which states that 
both the common and the civil law have supported a transition to the 
market economy in adaptation to their circumstances. In particular, 
judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature 
between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to 
protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential 
judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law 
countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground 
mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on 
practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional 
checks and balances that supported private property rights.  
From this adaptation perspective, we see a good part of the 
discussion on the efficiency of both legal traditions as focusing on 
relevant but relatively minor matters. This problem has been 
compounded in recent comparative studies by the difficulties of 
empirical comparisons in distinguishing causalities from correlations, 
and the fact that performances are observed only for choices that 
were effectively made, while the relevant comparison actually would 
be between the chosen option and its never observed alternative.2 
 
 1. Compare, however, the historical study of business’ organizational choices in France 
and in the United States during the era of industrialization. During the 19th century the 
contractual environment gave businesses in France a broader menu of organizational choices 
and greater ability to adapt the basic organizational forms to meet their needs. Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Legal Regime and Contractual Flexibility: A 
Comparison of Business’s Organizational Choices in France and the United States during the 
Era of Industrialization, 7 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 28 (2005). 
 2. See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Judge-Made Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 543 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000); Paul H. Rubin, Why 
is Common Law Efficient?, 6. J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). See also Robert Cooter & Lewis 
Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 
139 (1980); Avery Katz, Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditures, 8 INT’L REV. L. 
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Such comparative analyses therefore provide shaky grounds for 
policy recommendations. This may explain the recurrent paradox 
that, even though these empirical comparisons support the claim that 
the common law is superior to the civil law for the development of 
financial markets3 and economic growth,4 both transition and 
emerging economies opt for statutory law to create the legal basis of 
such markets. This choice follows the regulatory model of developed 
economies, which for many decades has been based on statutes. 
Our discussion, therefore, broadens the argument by Rubin5 that 
both common law and civil law facilitated freedom of contract and 
were efficient in the 19th century, and became interventionist in the 
20th century as a result of common causes. Without claiming 
anything about efficiency, however, we explain why both common 
law and civil law solutions were well adapted to their particular 
circumstances, and point out the agency and cognitive roots of the 
changes experienced by both systems in the 20th century. This 
provides a novel perspective on normative issues in this area, 
suggesting that the value of legal systems depends not only on their 
specific traits, but also on a good environmental fit. Our aim here is 
to identify the local circumstances that defined the balance of the 
institutional trade-off and the forces that are shaping the current 
tendencies. Further work is needed, however, to develop and test the 
conjecture that the problem of transition and developing economies 
more closely resembles the challenge of creating market institutions 
in 19th century Europe rather than their remote evolutionary 
emergence in countries of common law.  
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. In Part II we 
analyze the specialization advantages and costs of the judiciary, and 
state our hypothesis concerning the cognitive roots of the structures 
and evolution of common and civil law. We argue that common law 
countries featured greater judicial discretion because, given their 
 
& ECON. 127 (1988); Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law, 10 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 397 (1981). 
 3. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1148 
(1998). 
 4. Paul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 
J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001). 
 5. Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1982). 
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more gradual evolution away from the Ancient Regime, judges did 
not threaten the development of a modern market economy. 
Reformers in the civil law realm, in contrast, limited the discretion 
previously enjoyed by judges and put more rule-making in the hands 
of the legislature in an attempt to shelter free-market relations, and 
especially freedom of contract, from a potential judicial backlash. 
Both of these policies, promulgating codes and reducing judges’ 
discretion, shared the same goal: that of protecting freedom of 
contract and promoting market relationships and economic prosperity 
in areas previously suffering from mandatory rules and judicial 
regulation of private contracts.  
We then examine the consistency of our argument by reviewing 
the relevant historical evidence, in Part III, and the alternative 
explanations provided in recent comparative performance of legal 
systems, in Part IV. In particular, Part III analyzes the historical 
evidence on the evolution of both legal traditions, emphasizing the 
institutional details that contributed to their gradual divergence, 
which seemingly culminated at the end of the 19th and the beginning 
of the 20th centuries. We then compare, in Part IV, our argument 
with those produced in the recent debates about the comparative 
efficiency and performance of common and civil law. We contend 
that both theoretical and empirical claims on the superiority of the 
common law remain unproven. Legal systems do not operate in a 
vacuum; but rather, their performance depends on environmental 
conditions. Part V provides our conclusion, offering some opinions 
on viable policies, acknowledging the idea that legal systems must fit 
their environment, examining the policy implications, and 
emphasizing the importance of local circumstances for designing 
institutions.  
II. THE CHOICE OF RULE-MAKING POWERS 
Economic growth depends on market exchange, which requires a 
legal environment capable of increasing the capacity of parties to 
define wealth-enhancing terms of trade and to enforce them. Two key 
elements of this legal environment are rules and courts. Rules, given 
by customs, previous judicial decisions, and statutes, provide parties 
with default contract terms, and also predetermine the terms of trade 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/6
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to avoid externalities. Courts fill in the gaps in the contract and the 
received set of rules, defining the terms of exchange for unforeseen 
contingencies; provide enforcement of last-resort to contractual 
agreements; and, to a varying degree in different legal systems, create 
and modify rules.  
A. The Tradeoff of Judicial Discretion  
For our purposes, rules may be made by a central authority, such 
as a legislature or by courts. Courts’ rule-making is more 
decentralized when each court has the freedom to decide the law for 
its jurisdiction. Conversely, judicial rule-making is more centralized 
when low level courts must decide according to jurisprudence 
exclusively produced by some higher court. Both of these dimensions 
of judicial discretion, the rule-making authority enjoyed by the 
judicial system or the legislature and the decentralization of judicial 
powers, are uncorrelated6 or positively correlated, which allows us to 
treat judicial discretion as a single design variable. From this 
perspective, the main difference between legal systems hinges upon 
the degree of rule-making discretion enjoyed by courts.  
The idealized model of the common law, as it finally emerged in 
the 19th century, is characterized by greater discretion for courts 
because statutory law plays a minor role and each court is relatively 
free to rule originally, even with respect to precedent. Common law, 
developed in England and later imposed on former British colonies, 
creates legal rules in a relatively decentralized and bottom-up 
manner. Initiatives for new rules start at the local level when a case is 
decided by a judge who creates a new rule, which remains local until 
other judges use it in their rulings. Successful rules may eventually 
become accepted by all courts in the state. Rules therefore result from 
the interaction between plaintiffs, defendants, lawyers, judges, and 
jurors, as courts are relatively free to decide each case by 
 
 6. See Daniel Klerman & Paul Mahoney, Legal Origin?, Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, 
Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C07-5 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=968706 
(arguing that the centralization of justice in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was greater in 
France than in England while the decision-making authority of English and French judges was 
similar at the time). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 81 Arrunada Andonova book pages.doc 7/29/2008 9:49:00 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 26:81 
 
 
distinguishing from, reconciling with, or disapproving of an earlier 
case.  
In contrast, the civil law model, as crystallized more or less at the 
same time, gives priority to legislative rule-making. Courts are 
instructed to enforce the received law, and lower level courts have to 
comply with the jurisprudence created by higher courts even for 
filling gaps in rules and contracts. Civil law is more centralized, since 
the starting point for most new rules is legislation that applies to the 
whole state territory, and not only to the jurisdiction of one court. 
This legal tradition is based on Roman law, and is dominant in 
continental Europe, Japan, Turkey, and the former colonies of 
France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In civil law, judges are required to 
apply the rules, defined both by statutes and established case law 
(jurisprudence). Judges also fill in the gaps in contracts and rules in a 
manner similar to common law judges but with greater centralization, 
as explicit jurisprudence is only produced by repeated and consistent 
rulings of certain higher courts. This difference in the scope of rule-
making capacity of the civil law judge is not substantially affected by 
the fact that even the ideal civil and common law models of the 19th 
century share many other features. For instance, in both paradigms, 
courts form a hierarchy and superior courts can overrule decisions 
from lower courts. Any case may have substantial room for 
interpretation, evidenced by the fact that the U.S. appellate courts 
defer broadly to the trial judge’s and jury’s findings of fact.7 The 
presence of these common characteristics should not, however, 
obscure the existence of a basic difference in the extent of judges’ 
rule-making discretion. 
Additionally, common and civil law differ in other dimensions, 
such as the nature of the process, use of juries, and justification of 
judicial decisions.8 In common law, litigation is led by parties’ 
lawyers while judges remain neutral referees who only ensure that the 
parties follow the rules of procedure and evidence. The idea behind 
this adversarial process is that the truth will emerge in the dispute 
 
 7. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 584–86 (5th ed. 1998). 
 8. See, e.g., Richard E. Wagner, Common Law, Statute Law, and Economic Efficiency, in 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 313 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998). 
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between the two sides. In civil law, however, judges take a more 
active, inquisitorial role and parties often have to answer judicial 
questions, on the basis that judges have a direct interest in revealing 
the truth in private disputes. Common and civil law also differ in 
their reliance on juries, with civil law making limited use of juries, a 
feature that ties in with the lesser discretion and the inquisitorial role 
of the judge. Finally, judge-made law in common law countries is 
justified by reliance on precedent, social norms, or rationality. 
Judicial rulings in civil law countries are based more on the meaning 
of the code, with case law and rationality playing secondary roles. 
This difference also affects the way that lawyers are trained. 
Common law is learned by analyzing case law, while civil law is 
taught by studying the code and commentaries on it. 
All kinds of rule-making systems are likely to fail in achieving the 
public good because they pursue private interests or, even when 
pursuing the public good, they fail to ascertain which rules are more 
suitable to achieve it, often triggering rent seeking by parties to 
private contracts. We will argue that in the development of the 
Western legal system, cognitive departures are the main determinant 
of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. In our framework, 
differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack 
of information require a cognitive failure to be active.  
1. Self-Interest 
With self-interest, it is clear that legislatures suffer from agency 
and collective action problems, which can be palliated but not fully 
avoided by political competition and institutional checks and 
balances. Consequently, a large number of mandatory rules that today 
govern private contracting are alleged to neither improve individuals’ 
rationality nor avoid externalities but simply to redistribute wealth.9 
 
 9.  See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for 
Political Influence, 97 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); James Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit 
Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3 (James Buchanan et al. eds., 
1980); Sam Peltzman, Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 
(1979); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 
3 (1971); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 
224 (1967).  
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Decentralized rule-making by the judiciary is similarly hindered, 
however, by the private interests of all participants in the litigation 
process, judges included,10 who also show themselves as self-
interested agents, sometimes in obvious ways that lead to corruption 
and congestion of courts.  
We will assume that the rent-seeking costs of legislative rule-
making do not change with the degree of judicial discretion. This 
assumption is mainly grounded in the fact that the legislature retains 
full powers, regardless of the degree of rule-making discretion 
granted to courts. Consequently, even when courts are initially given 
full discretion, the legislature can enact laws that end up constraining 
them. This is true historically, as the common law legislature always 
had enjoyed the authority to change common law rules, while even 
the highest courts were constrained by precedent.11 One clear 
example is the final acceptance of the New Deal by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. We are certainly not arguing that legislation involves no 
transaction costs, but rather that these transaction costs were not the 
determining factor for the choice between the levels of judicial 
discretion characterizing the ideal common law and civil law models 
of the 19th century. These transaction costs could not be 
determinative because of variability in rent seeking potential across 
legal fields, and legislative residual power.  
Similarly, the extent of judicial rent-seeking should not be 
substantially altered by the degree of rule-making discretion enjoyed 
by judges, who do not need to be producing rules to become corrupt 
or indolent. In addition, the fields of law (property, contract, torts) 
and the prevalence of default rules based on custom and established 
doctrine, which represent the bulk of legislation in the 19th century,12 
did not offer much potential for profitable rent-seeking at the 
legislative level. On the contrary, these fields may be more profitable 
for rent-seeking at the judicial level, by litigating specific contracts, 
but this only happens if the courts suffer cognitive biases that might 
 
 10.  For a description of the objective function of judges, see Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial 
Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994).  
 11. Henry Manne, The Judiciary and Free Markets, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 20 
(1997). 
 12. Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S. ECON. J. 644 
(1989). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/6
p 81 Arrunada Andonova book pages.doc 7/29/2008 9:49:00 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Pro-Market Adaptations 89 
 
 
be used by the parties. Therefore, it follows more of a cognitive 
rather than a self-interest rationale.  
2. Information 
With respect to information, the allocation of rule-making power 
between legislators and courts also poses the typical problem of 
decentralization with respect to the availability and incentives to 
produce the relevant information and the costs of transferring 
information when decisions are not made where such information is 
available.13 In our case, if a sufficient number of judges are available, 
decentralized judicial rule-making is usually thought to be more 
responsive to local and changing market circumstances because of its 
limited geographical scope, its proximity to market participants, and 
its relatively speedy process. In addition, in the presence of local 
courts with overlapping jurisdiction, decentralized rule-making is 
driven by competitive forces toward constant improvement.14 In 
contrast, centralized rule-making and statutory law lack similar 
competitive pressures, especially in the short term (even if 
international mobility of resources is reducing this difference), but 
enjoy an advantage over decentralized rule-making in codifying 
default rules dispersed in custom, jurisprudence, and doctrine, as well 
as in developing standards for new kinds of contracts.15 Centralized 
 
 13. Masahiko Aoki, Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm, 76 AM. 
ECON. REV. 971 (1986); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Specific and General 
Knowledge, and Organizational Structure, 8 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4 (1995); Raaj Kumar Sah 
& Joseph E. Stiglitz, Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 98 ECON. J. 451 (1988). 
 14. Todd Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side 
Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1575. 
 15.  Compare this with Schwartz, who suggests that the role of the state should be 
minimal because the cost of creating rules is too high when parties are as heterogeneous as they 
are today and standards are too imprecise to be of much value. Moreover, information 
asymmetry hindering private contracting cannot be avoided by the state doing in law what the 
parties cannot do in contract. Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389 (1994); Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 
2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
This may also explain experimental results such as those described by Korobkin. Russell B. 
Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 116 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000). Schwartz’s view deals with serious 
limitations of law-making but probably underestimates the private and social costs of 
contracting in the absence of default rules and standards, as well as minimizing the role of rules 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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rule-making may also be superior in enacting mandatory rules that 
improve individuals’ rationality and avoid negative externalities, 
which may not be dealt with in a decentralized process of rule 
emergence. A mandatory statute, in contrast, has the potential to 
force coordination, internalize network effects, and thus overcome 
the drive toward local, instead of global, efficiency characterizing 
decentralized rule-making.16  
As in many decentralized decisions in all kinds of organizations, 
these opposing factors are hard to add up to a unique criterion. If 
anything, one could argue that the greater scope of markets after the 
industrial revolution, especially after the advent of transportation 
technologies, called for more centralized solutions. We are also 
inclined, however, to discard the availability and production of 
information as a decisive factor in explaining the observed 
differences in the rule-making power allocated to courts by the 
common and civil law.17 The reason is that larger markets may call 
for greater coordination of rules, but this can be achieved by 
strengthening the binding character of precedents, as the common law 
did during the 19th century.  
3. Biased Rationality 
Cognitive differences may have played a bigger role than both 
self-interest and information. Following the growing literature on 
decision biases and heuristics,18 much attention in this field has been 
 
in reducing the impact of information asymmetry. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling 
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985). See 
also James J. Choi, Optimal Defaults, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 180 (2003) (providing a brief 
account and references on the power of default options). 
 16. Sophie Harnay, Was Napoleon a Benevolent Dictator? An Economic Justification for 
Codification, 14 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 237 (2002). 
 17. Compare this with Glaeser and Shleifer who argue that the adoption of the jury system 
in England and of the Romano-canonical trial procedure in France in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries determined the divergence between the two countries’ legal systems. Edward L. 
Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1193 (2002). Klerman and Mahoney 
argue that the adoption of different trial procedures was dictated by the need for high-quality 
information given that the number of justices in England and France differed dramatically 
during the period. Klerman & Mahoney, supra note 6.  
 18.  See generally THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/6
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paid to the biases that judges may suffer when deciding cases. 
Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich show empirically, by means of a 
questionnaire answered by 167 federal judges in the United States, 
that these judges fail mainly by relying on irrelevant starting points to 
construct inferences (“anchoring effect”), by overestimating both the 
ex ante predictability of events after they occur (“hindsight bias”) and 
in their own ability to reach correct decisions (“overconfidence”).19 
Judges also treated equivalent gains and losses differently (falling 
prey of “framing effects”) and ignored relevant background statistical 
information in favor of irrelevant individuating information (a 
conduct known as “representativeness bias”).20 Experimental results 
are difficult to interpret conclusively, however. For instance, in their 
seemingly biased responses judges may well be considering the 
allegedly irrelevant cue provided by experimenters (such as a 
defendants’ move for dismissal when testing for anchoring effects) in 
the context of their previous court experiences, which could deny the 
alleged irrelevance of such a move.21  
The most interesting of these biases is related to hindsight, that is, 
the tendency to attach greater probabilities to those events that have 
occurred than to those that have not.22 Its presence in the legal system 
and the strategies used to handle it have been studied mainly in the 
narrow context of negligence judgments,23 but hindsight bias may 
have much wider effects when the legal system allows judges to 
consider the balance of compensation between the parties, as it did in 
 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (2002); CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES (Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 15; 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Vernon L. 
Smith, Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 465 
(2003).  
 19. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Evidence on hindsight bias, a phenomenon first described by Fischhoff, has been 
accumulating over time. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome 
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION 
& PERFORMANCE 288 (1975); cf. Jay J. Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia F. Willham, The 
Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
147 (1991). 
 23. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 588–90 (1998). 
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the Ancient Regime under the influence of canon law. In that case, 
judges will tend to give too much weight to ex post apparent 
imbalances without taking into account that such imbalances are 
often only the result of random events which could have led to 
different outcomes in which the net balance of compensation would 
have been different. Consequently, the bias motivates parties to 
devote resources both to using the bias in their benefit and to 
preventing it, so that contracts were often structured in order to avoid 
this type of opportunism. The presence of hindsight bias may 
therefore support a policy constraining the freedom of judges to 
evaluate the balance of compensation between the parties.  
Most of these decision failures may be contained by reducing 
judicial discretion. For example, Rachlinski explains the set of 
constraints used by the legal system to reduce the effect of the 
hindsight bias in courts’ decisions.24 These constraints include taking 
compliance with norms as evidence of reasonable care in negligence 
cases; using secondary evidence of non-obviousness in patent cases; 
requiring more evidence than injury as proof of negligence; 
suppressing evidence on subsequent adoption of remedial measures, 
which would exacerbate the hindsight bias; and adopting a “no 
liability” rule for certain situations, like the business judgment rule in 
corporate law.25  
These biases, however, cannot explain the different path followed 
by common and civil law, because both judiciaries suffer these biases 
to a similar extent. If anything, greater reliance on popular juries 
would advise less discretion in the common law, the opposite to the 
historical pattern.  
4. Ecological Rationality and the Unnaturalness of Markets 
In addition, there are reasons to think that decision failures of this 
kind are arguably not the most important cognitive bias for the 
optimal allocation of rule-making power. In particular, courts may be 
systematically biased to consider an evolutionary, outdated concept 
of justice. Taking this into account, a more comprehensive 
 
 24. See id. at 602–25. 
 25. For a broader analysis, see Guthrie et al., supra note 19, at 821–28.  
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explanation of both types of failures can be given in terms of 
“ecological” rationality, which is bounded not so much because it is 
subject to constraints as because it is adapted to certain environments: 
first, to our common ancestral “environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness” and, second, with more malleable consequences, to our 
learning environment.26 Therefore, even benevolent rulemakers may 
systematically rule against efficiency because their instincts 
predispose them to solutions that were adaptive in our evolutionary 
past but are no longer adaptive in our current environment.  
In particular, given that market relations are, in the evolutionary 
time scale, very new, they tend to be systematically misunderstood by 
poorly-cultured judges, leading to misguided justice. Findings in 
evolutionary psychology support the intriguing idea that these 
failures may respond to instinctive human traits being applied out of 
context.27  
 
 26.  See GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999); 
Herbert Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of Environments, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129 
(1956); John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE 
ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 19 
(Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992). From this perspective, the importance of biases 
documented by experimental psychology and economics has been questioned because 
experiments may fail to face decision-makers with relevant situations, oversimplifying the 
informational structure of real problems. See GIGERENZER ET AL., supra; Leda Cosmides & 
John Tooby, Are Humans Good Intuitive Statisticians After All? Rethinking Some Conclusions 
from the Literature on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 58 COGNITION 1 (1996); Jonathan J. 
Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive Normative, and Methodological 
Challenges, 19 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (1996). The usefulness of evolutionary psychology has 
also been criticized by Korobkin Rachlinski, and Ulen, the main concern being its inability to 
produce univocal predictions. See Russell B. Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to 
Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Evolutionary Psychology, 41 
JURIMETRICS J. 319, 323–27 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Is Evolutionary Analysis of Law 
Science or Storytelling?, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 365–70 (2001); Thomas S. Ulen, Evolution, Human 
Behavior, and Law: A Response to Owen Jones’s Dunwody Lecture, 53 FLA. L. REV. 931, 938–
40 (2001). For a defense of evolutionary psychology, see Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary 
Analysis in Law: Some Objections Considered, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 207 (2001), and, for a 
much-needed integrative view that defends combining rational choice and evolutionary 
psychology with empirical analysis in a multi-disciplinary enterprise, see Korobkin, supra. 
 27.  See ALLAN PAGE FISKE, STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL LIFE: THE FOUR ELEMENTARY 
FORMS OF HUMAN RELATIONS (1991); Cosmides & Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations, supra note 
26, at 163. These findings provide a common, and more solid, ground to the pioneering and 
rival arguments of Polanyi, on the limits of market-type relations and the resistance of societies 
to its dominance, and, mainly, Hayek, on the opposing rules of the “extended order of 
cooperation through markets” and the more intimate and personal order. The evolutionary 
argument helps explain both the difficulties for “disembedding” the economy, in Polanyi’s 
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Judicial proclivity to redistributive justice and to balanced 
compensation fits in neatly with the prevalent role that sharing, 
authority, and reciprocity have arguably played in most human 
interaction during our ancestral “environment of evolutionary 
adaptation.”28 The apparent disregard that some judges show for the 
effect of their rulings on later trade seems also adapted to the 
ancestral environment in which trade was only made on the basis of 
reciprocity and most interactions took place among relatives and 
personal contacts. This probably causes a bias in favor of identifiable 
individuals and against anonymous parties,29 a bias which is also 
likely to result in damaging judicial rulings. Such biases are more 
serious when an element of abstraction is present in the transaction 
because human minds, in contrast to their more intuitive 
understanding of concrete barter of physical goods, show intuitive 
 
terms, and the tendency to apply personnel rules to the market order, in Hayek’s terms. See 
generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE 
ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); 
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL 
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY (1976); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE FATAL 
CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1988). The danger that the primitive collectivistic 
leanings of human beings pose to the market has also been stressed by Smith from the 
perspective of experimental economics. See Smith, supra note 18. For an interpretation of the 
role of institutions as a solution for human maladaptation, see Benito Arruñada, Human Nature 
and Institutions, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS: A GUIDEBOOK (Eric Brousseau & Jean-
Michel Glachant eds.). 
 28. FISKE, supra note 27; Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 26. 
 29. The idea of favoring people we know is reinforced by findings that people faced with 
cooperation games cooperate more when they are allowed to communicate than when they play 
against anonymous parties. Robyn M. Dawes et al., Behavior, Communication and Assumptions 
about Other People’s Behavior in a Commons Dilemma Situation, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1 (1977); Mark R. Isaac et al., Public Goods Provision in an Experimental 
Environment, 26 J. PUB. ECON. 51 (1985); Mark R. Isaac & James M. Walker, Communication 
and Free Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 585 
(1988); Kathleen Valley et al., How Communication Improves Efficiency in Bargaining Games, 
38 GAMES & BEHAV. ECON. 127 (2002). This is the case even for one-shot interactions but 
especially as communication opportunities increase. Elinor Ostrom et al., Covenants with and 
Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible, 86 AM POL. SCI. REV. 404 (1992). In addition to 
this bias, likely rooted in mental mechanisms evolved to facilitate cooperation, human beings 
have been shown to suffer substantial difficulties when making more than a few cycles of 
mental inferences in experimental settings, difficulties that could hinder the full evaluation of 
those rulings affecting market transactions, given that markets act through long series of 
overlapping effects. Colin F. Camerer et al., Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in 
Games, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 192 (2003); Rosemarie Nagel, Unraveling in Guessing Games: An 
Experimental Study, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1313 (1995). 
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resistance to grasping the value added by providers in abstract 
transactions. Mainly, these include those that involve intangible 
services and inter-temporal exchange, such as the use of capital and 
payment of interest; elusive services, such as mediation and arbitrage; 
and services provided by human capital that has been created through 
previous and therefore now invisible investments, like professional 
services. Not by chance, all of these abstract transactions historically 
have been among the first to be restricted or forbidden. More 
recently, the judicial apprehension against adhesion contracts can be 
traced to the same cause. The different treatment courts give to such 
contracts and to physical products, even though both are complex 
designs produced by competitive firms, can be attributed to this 
human tendency. As Manne pointed out, judges are willing to void a 
clause because the buyer does not understand it but they do not cease 
enforcing the purchase of a car because the buyer does not 
understand its engineering.30 
This argument fits in well with some tendencies in judicial 
rulings. A common consequence of instinct are rulings, believed to be 
“fair” for an individual case, which favor the weaker party to a 
contract but, as a result, harm all weak parties to future contracts, 
who will end up paying higher prices or will be unable to contract. If, 
for example, a ruling in an insolvency case considers the debtor’s 
poverty, it might resolve an individual problem, but, to the extent that 
it prevents creditors from collecting their debts, it hinders all loans 
that might be subject to similar rulings in the future. As a result, the 
ruling also harms anonymous potential debtors of a similar type to 
the beneficiary of the judgment, who are deprived of access to credit 
or will have to pay additional interest. In a similar vein, the 
substitution of the employment-at-will doctrine for unjust dismissal 
doctrines in several U.S. states has been found to have damaged new 
workers in those states, causing, among other consequences, 
significant increases in temporary workers.31 The argument is also 
 
 30. Manne, supra note 11, at 34.  
 31. David Autor, Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismissal Doctrine to 
the Growth of Employment Outsourcing, 21 J. LAB. ECON. 1 (2003); Thomas J. Miles, Common 
Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and U.S. Labor Markets, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74 
(2000). 
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applicable to courts’ bias against the exercise of quasi-judicial 
decision rights by the parties, even when the parties themselves have 
explicitly contracted for these quasi-judicial rights ex ante. Such an 
arrangement is often efficient when one of the parties has the best 
information and incentives to carry out such a judicial task because of 
its central position and reputation.32 This quasi-judicial activity, 
crucial when controlling a network of producers, is undermined in 
court when judges interpret the subject matter of litigation as deriving 
from greater bargaining power on the part of the larger party and not 
from the ex post exercise of judicial functions that were contractually 
allocated ex ante by the parties. Such ex post contractual asymmetry 
tends to be perceived by judges in different countries as unfair and 
they therefore tend to correct it, thus inefficiently restricting the 
quasi-judicial powers, which the private contract itself allocates to 
one of the parties, and leading the parties to introduce additional 
contractual clauses with the purpose of avoiding judicial 
intervention.33  
In sum, when insufficiently cultured about the market,34 judges 
keep sentencing as if they were living in a non-market economy in 
which transactions are relatively unique, concrete, and reciprocal 
events, in which no credit element is involved.35 Do legislators also 
 
 32. This explains why car manufacturers are assigned rights in relation to their dealers to 
define their obligations, assess their performance, and, as the case may be, punish or reward 
them. Benito Arruñada et al., Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The 
Case of Automobile Distribution, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 257 (2001). Many suppliers carry out 
similar quasi-judicial functions with respect to their retailers.  
 33.  Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, United States Versus United Shoe Machinery 
Corporation: On the Merits, 36 J.L. & ECON. 33 (1993). Judges may also oppose the exercise 
of quasi-judicial functions by one party to protect its own power and thus eliminate 
competition.  
 34. Two remarks are in order. First, the “culturalization” that we are referring to is linked 
to an understanding of how the market works and has no necessary connection to the amount of 
formal training. Second, judges are influenced by cultural factors, such as education and 
religion, but these cultural influences always operate on a biological basis, which is constrained 
by the ancestral environment, the only evolutionary-relevant environment, as opposed to the 
current and historical environments. See THE ADAPTED MIND, supra note 26. For an 
introduction and updated references, see also STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997); 
Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the Invisible 
Hand, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 327 (1994).  
 35.  Our emphasis on judicial biases complements recent applications of evolutionary 
psychology to legal theory, most of which focus on how the law interacts with evolved minds, 
understand as legal actors such as citizens, holders of liability, contractual parties, or criminals. 
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suffer this anti-market bias to a similar extent? For some issues, such 
as those related to identification of individuals, it is clear they do not, 
because the legislature generally rules in more abstract terms and for 
anonymous parties, without respect to specific cases (at least in 
private law), while judges have a personal contact with the parties. 
However, this supposed advantage would affect all legal systems 
equally and cannot therefore explain the discrepancy in judicial 
discretion between the common and the civil law.  
Furthermore, for most issues, legislatures are quite willing to 
follow redistributive policies, abrogating contracts if necessary, as 
has occurred often in history with debt contracts.36 In general, the 
existence of a cognitive gap in favor of the legislature hinges on the 
structure of the political system. We maintain that legislators did not 
suffer a similar anti-market bias in Continental Europe in the 19th 
century. As a result, a cognitive gap opened between legislators and 
judges, because the political system left the government in the hands 
of intellectual elites who had market experience and could also 
contemplate the profit opportunities brought about by economic 
change. The old Continental judiciary, however, was still staffed by a 
sort of nobility raised and anchored in the Ancient Regime. This is 
highly visible in the function of parliaments which, at the time, were 
considered the finders of the true and rational solution—the law. The 
intention was that the law should endure and be applied universally. 
In contrast, parliaments evolved in the 20th century as weighing 
machines or battlegrounds that reached equilibriums among private 
interests and produced mere “rules” according to the momentary will 
of the prevailing consensus, with no pretence of permanence and 
often in violation of freedom and equality as both concepts were 
previously understood.37  
 
See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Law and Biology: Toward an Integrated Model of Human Behavior, 
8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 167 (1997); see also Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in 
Law: Some Objections Considered, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 207, 209 (2001). 
 36. For example, consider the farm foreclosure moratorium enacted in the United States in 
the 1930s, upheld by the Supreme Court in 1934. Lee J. Alston, Farm Foreclosure Moratorium 
Legislation: A Lesson from the Past, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 445 (1984). 
 37.  This process was described, if not explained, by Schmitt. CARL SCHMITT, LEGALIDAD 
Y LEGITIMIDAD [LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY] (1971) (Spain). It is now often seen as an 
exaggeration of democracy to the detriment of liberty. See, e.g., FAREED ZAKARIA, THE 
FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND ABROAD (2003). In particular, 
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B. Hypothesis: The Pro-Market Orientation of the Western Legal 
System  
The set of assumptions behind our cost and benefit analysis of 
judicial rule-making discretion, particularly the insignificance of self-
interest, are equivalent to assuming a benevolent legislator who wants 
to create a market economy. This perspective is relevant for current 
discussions on how to develop market-supporting institutions in 
transitioning and developing economies. Historically, market 
institutions were created in a more spontaneous manner in common 
law societies. In civil law societies of the 19th century, however, they 
were subject to a greater degree of intervention by the builders of the 
liberal state, and therefore could be treated as decision variables. In 
analyzing civil law, we can then personalize these state builders who 
wanted to create a market economy, whereas in common law we have 
to assume a fictional social planner. However, the difference is not 
substantive. 
Another assumption made is that predispositions toward the 
market order may develop differently among legislators and judges.38 
Consequently, this benevolent legislator will allocate rule-making 
discretion to the judiciary by considering the specific circumstances 
in each country. In particular, legislators creating market institutions 
may restrain judicial rule-making to avoid judges’ opposition to 
freedom of contract and market exchange by compulsorily subjecting 
the judge to the law and thus guaranteeing the enforceability of 
private contracts. From this perspective, both Western legal systems 
might therefore be understood as adaptations to specific conditions 
that allow the development of effective market-supporting 
institutions in different historical circumstances.  
In particular, modern market relations were introduced sooner in 
England, as many feudal constraints were abrogated earlier and the 
Industrial Revolution also took hold earlier. These changes also took 
place more slowly, without such drastic changes in property rights as 
 
see also how, in England before the Reform Act of 1832, law was something to be “deduced,” 
not to be created. RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 127 (1999).  
 38. See Benito Arruñada & Veneta Andonova, Market Institutions and Judicial Rule-
making, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 229 (Claude Menard & Mary 
Shirley eds., 2005).  
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on the Continent. This creeping evolutionary process, together with a 
generalized respect for private property, gave time for judges and the 
public to be cultured in an intellectual tradition more propitious to the 
free market. In most of Continental Europe, however, most of the 
constraints that the Ancient Regime imposed on trade and movement 
of land and people were suppressed later and more abruptly,39 often 
together with a redistribution of property. Most judges were then still 
the intellectual product of the Ancient Regime, in addition to part of 
the former ruling elite. Their lack of understanding of the market and 
disrespect for property rights explain why the defenders of 
contractual freedom, responsible for designing the institutions for 
continental markets, opted to constrain judicial discretion.40 From this 
perspective, we explain the restrictions imposed on judges in the civil 
law tradition to subject their rulings to contractual terms (explicit or 
tacit through acceptance of default statute law and jurisprudence) as 
an institutional control designed to protect an unnatural creation, 
market contracting, from our ancestral collectivistic, reciprocal, and 
redistributional instincts.41  
III. EXAMINING HISTORY 
We will now examine in more detail the evolution of both legal 
traditions, to corroborate that the above arguments are consistent with 
their history. We first confirm that institutional checks and balances, 
and judicial training shaped the common tendency toward market-
based relationships in England and in the Continent in very different 
ways. Second, we conceive the convergence of Western legal 
 
 39. The dominance of agriculture in the economies of these centuries should be kept in 
mind when considering that market relations for trade in goods had been well established in 
some areas of the Continent, probably better than in England, as shown by the history of Italian 
cities in the Middle Ages, the Hanseatic League or the Champagne fairs, to cite just a few 
examples. This applies, in particular, when ascertaining the importance of merchant law. The 
challenge for those creating the institutions of the modern market is to develop institutions not 
only for trade, but mainly for transactions among non-merchants. 
 40. It is possible that judicial discretion was, to a certain extent, already limited in the 
Roman law tradition from the 12th century, but this does not deny that later evolution 
additionally constrains judges’ discretion and plays a market enhancing function. 
 41. Compare this with La Porta et al. who see the civil law as an attempt to further the 
power of the state. Rafael La Porta et al., The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
222 (1999).  
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traditions during the 20th century as a restoration of instinctive social 
patterns, made possible by the democratization of the political 
system, which removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and 
political leaders.  
A. The Evolution of Common Law and its Judiciary  
The commencement of what was to become the English common 
law system dates back to the 12th century, when Henry II (1154–89) 
created a professional royal judiciary and enlisted local communities 
to participate in the administration of justice. The further 
development of the English common law was shaped by the political 
struggle and the resulting balance between Crown and Parliament. 
The English Parliament was one of the few to survive from the 
Middle Ages, constantly increasing its control over the Crown.42 The 
result was a creeping shift of power from the Crown to the 
Parliament, eventually culminating in the Glorious Revolution, which 
further limited the Crown’s right to tax and thus to interfere with 
private property rights, but was just only one more step in a relatively 
continuous process.43 The English Parliament, staffed by merchants 
and landed gentry, then used its enhanced powers to ignite a series of 
market-oriented reforms based on the principle of non-interference 
with private property.44  
The success of the reforms was guaranteed as the common law 
courts and the English judiciary shared the Parliament’s appreciation 
 
 42. DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT P. THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A 
NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973); PIPES, supra note 37. 
 43. Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J.L. & 
ECON. 803 (1989). 
 44.  DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE & CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981); North 
& Weingast, supra note 43. This view has been criticized by historians who point out that in 
spite of their absolutist nature, the Continent—particularly France—had well-developed 
markets as well. PHILIP T. HOFFMANN, GILLES POSTEL-VINAY & JEAN-LAURENT ROSENTHAL, 
PRICELESS MARKETS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CREDIT IN PARIS, 1660–1870 (2001). Even 
though researchers argue about the actual impact of the English Parliament on the development 
of a market-based economy, they do not question the deeper and earlier control exerted by it. 
STEPHEN R. EPSTEIN, THE RISE OF STATES AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, 1300–1750 (2000). 
Bruce G. Carruthers, Politics, Popery, and Property: A Comment on North and Weingast, 50 J. 
ECON. HIST. 693 (1990); Gregory Clark, The Political Foundations of Modern Economic 
Growth: England, 1540–1800, 26 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 563 (1996). 
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of property rights and its understanding of market mechanisms. The 
appointment of English judgeships depended to a much greater extent 
than elsewhere in Europe on professional practice, as English judges 
were chosen from among barristers.45 As such, they had seen the 
world from the perspective of the parties they had represented and 
were therefore more familiar and educated on the intricacies of the 
incipient market economy.46 The understanding by English judges of 
the fundamentals of the market economy also benefited from the 
early checks imposed on royal authority, as these checks limited the 
ability of the Crown to sell new public offices,47 making judgeships 
secure investments and converting early common law judges into 
defenders of private property rights. As a result, the transformation of 
the feudal economy spurred on by Parliament received an early ally 
in the English judiciary which, by making incremental changes in 
long-standing customs, assisted the evolutionary development of 
common law toward the new market order.  
The expansion of market opportunities by the Industrial 
Revolution demanded more substantial changes in terms of both 
developed and uniform rules. Common law satisfied these demands 
during the 19th century, mainly through the introduction of many 
Roman law solutions and the strengthening of the doctrine of binding 
precedent, by which courts are reluctant to interfere with principles 
established in previous decisions (stare decisis). Despite these 
changes, however, the development of common law toward more 
market-oriented institutions remained evolutionary in nature and its 
courts retained a high degree of discretion, both in England and the 
U.S.48 This was for two reasons. First, the introduction of Roman law 
took place mainly at the level of concepts because codification 
attempts did not succeed, arguably because they were less necessary 
 
 45. DANIEL DUMAN, THE JUDICIAL BENCH IN ENGLAND 1727–1875: THE RESHAPING OF 
A PROFESSIONAL ELITE 29 (1982). 
 46. KEITH ABBOTT & NORMAN PENDLEBURY, BUSINESS LAW (1933); DUMAN, supra note 
45. 
 47. KOENDRAAD W. SWART, SALE OF OFFICES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 45–67 
(1980). 
 48. See DANIEL KLERMAN & PAUL MAHONEY, The Value of Judicial Independence: 
Evidence from 18th Century England, 7 AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW 1 (2005) for 
the development of common law under English judges. For development of common law under 
U.S. judges, see Zywicki, supra note 14. 
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than in the Continent.49 In addition, common law lawyers did not 
merely borrow ideas from Continental jurists, but developed and 
adapted such ideas in their own way.50 Moreover, the legal 
development of common law, which supported the huge economic 
development of the 19th century, remained almost exclusively the 
work of courts, with few legislative initiatives.51 Second, 
strengthening the doctrine of binding precedent did not divert 
common law from its evolutionary path, as precedents still could be 
overturned with relative ease by distinguishing the case at hand from 
the one in the precedent.52 Together with the right of appeal, the 
doctrine was, however, important in ensuring consistency and 
equality across increasingly wider markets.53  
American common law, to the extent that it was independent of 
English law, shows remarkable similarities. Until the 20th century, 
the U.S. had an arrangement similar to the English system of 
competing courts, with state and federal courts.54 Court competition, 
however, was not so intense and judges were not paid on a fee 
basis.55 Many judges, however, were elected and this probably served 
as a substitute incentive mechanism in the absence of a fee for 
 
 49. This divergence in the success of codification is consistent with the argument that 
continental codification was driven by the need to constraint judges, more than to systematize 
the law, which was probably equally unsystematic in England and on the Continent. 
 50. BRIAN SIMPSON, ENGLISH COMMON LAW, 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 57–70 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 51. This does not mean, however, that England did not need legislative interventions to 
make possible market enhancing institutions which were being hindered by a conservative 
judiciary. See, for example, on the recurrent failure of the English judiciary to accommodate the 
basic working principles of company law until forced by statute law, RON HARRIS, 
INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 230–86, 
1720–1844 (2000). As Harris says, “the turn to legislation was not unique to company law. The 
days of Mansfield and Blackstone were over, and the limited scale of reforms that could be 
achieved through common law became more evident as Bentham and the law reform movement 
of the early nineteenth century demonstrated. The province of legislation was being determined 
and Parliament became the target of reformers in criminal law, procedure, and other fields.” Id. 
at 249. 
 52. The demand for more binding precedents during the 19th century is understandable 
because of the greater geographical scope of the market, triggered by better transportation 
technologies (channels, railroads, steamships), which required faster adoption of uniform legal 
standards in a wider area.  
 53. Manne, supra note 11, at 13–19. 
 54. Zywicki, supra note 14. 
 55. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/6
p 81 Arrunada Andonova book pages.doc 7/29/2008 9:49:00 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Pro-Market Adaptations 103 
 
 
service.56 American common law judges also enjoyed great discretion 
that was marginally reduced in the 19th century by the adoption of 
the doctrine of binding precedent, first for procedural and later for 
substantive rules.57 
B. The Law in the Continent  
Legal history in what are now civil law jurisdictions originally 
resembled English law. The evolution of civil law, however, was 
influenced by a relatively different balance of powers among the 
main political actors, as parliaments in Continental Europe, with a 
few exceptions, rapidly lost their ability to impose controls on the 
Crown.58 Most monarchies became financially independent and a 
considerable part of their income no longer came from taxes needing 
previous parliamentary approval.59 As a result, absolutist Continental 
kings enjoyed unchecked power and interfered with relative ease in 
private property rights, thus hampering the development of market 
relations based on secure private property.60 
These institutional limitations were reinforced by the fact that 
Continental judges were appointed without previous practice.61 In 
addition, their training was based on the university study of ius 
commune, a doctrinal system developed mainly by scholars proficient 
in Roman and Cannon law, and only secondarily affected by statutes 
and judicial rulemaking.62 It has been claimed that both the lack of 
practice and these doctrinal influences made Continental judges more 
resistant to capitalist wealth accumulation and hindered their 
understanding of market transactions.63 Market relationships, with 
their considerable risk of exposure and striving for profit, were hardly 
understood by a judiciary which derived most of its income and 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 42; PIPES, supra note 37. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. WILLIAM DOYLE, VENALITY: THE SALE OF OFFICES IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
FRANCE (1996). 
 62. Id. 
 63. ARRUÑADA & ANDONOVA, supra note 38. 
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status from risk-free rents.64 Judicial respect for property rights also 
probably suffered because judgeships were often expropriated by 
kings who were free to sell new judicial offices.65 Thus, the judiciary 
on the Continent did not gradually erode the constraints of the 
Ancient Regime.  
Because of both institutional constraints and judicial training, civil 
law judges ended up constituting a barrier to the development of new 
market relationships. Liberal reformers could not have chosen to 
maintain greater judicial rule-making authority while changing the 
method of judicial selection because jurists were educated in the 
same dogmatic legal tradition. An abrupt change in both the law and 
the administration of justice was therefore necessary.  
C. The Creation of Modern Civil Law 
The new legal order was mostly implemented in a top-down 
fashion even if it was essentially a liberal (that is, free-market-
enhancing) initiative. Legislators issuing Civil and Commercial 
Codes in the 19th century aimed at regulating externalities and 
systematizing custom and case law mainly through default rules. 
They did not promulgate mandatory rules unless they were necessary 
to establish basic political and economic principles of freedom, 
equality, and property, often debasing interventionist legal 
doctrines.66 Their reliance on case law led to the codification of well 
tried default rules without precluding parties from adapting the 
contract freely to their circumstances by writing specific clauses into 
them. In addition, codification benefited from the substantial 
convergence of doctrinal criteria that was already highly influential in 
courts’ rulings because of the prevalent regime of judicial personal 
liability. As a result, 19th century codified law was mainly the 
distillation of customary law, and codes represented a combination of 
local customs, local laws and subsidiary Roman law.67  
 
 64. George Taylor, Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution, 72 
AM. HIST. REV. 469 (1967). 
 65. DOYLE, supra note 61; SWART, supra note 47. 
 66. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORIAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW (D.E.L. 
Johnston trans., 2003). 
 67.  Boudewijn Sirks, Roman Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
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In addition, most mandatory rules enacted at the time had a clear 
function in grounding the market economy. Probably the most 
important of these mandatory rules are a direct consequence of the 
political principles of freedom and equality, which have contractual 
correlates in terms of mandatory freedom of contract and mandatory 
equality of all contractual parties.68 But it is also applicable to the 
emphasis of liberal reforms in avoiding the future entail of property 
and facilitating the emergence of a proper market for land.69 Property 
law provides another interesting case in its treatment of externalities 
caused in the Ancient Regime by the proliferation of property rights 
and the enforcement as rights in rem even when they remained 
hidden to third parties. During the 19th century, land law reform and 
the creation of land registers led to a stricter policy of numerus 
clausus in most European countries, that is, the legal system started 
to enforce only a limited number of rights in rem, enforcing the rest 
as mere personal (i.e., contractual) rights. In parallel, publicity was 
increasingly required to produce rights enforceable in rem. While 
both of these constraints seem to diminish parties’ freedom to 
produce rights in rem, in fact they are essential to make some of them 
possible by reducing transaction costs of acquiring land and making 
possible the use of land as collateral for credit, precisely the declared 
purpose of the reforms in this area.70  
Furthermore, operationally, the civil law bound the judge to the 
law. This has often been seen only as a tool to enforce state law, 
although the main effect of default rules were to protect freedom of 
contract by making sure the judge was constrained by the will of the 
parties. Therefore, the law protected the private legal order freely 
 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 356 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). In particular, codifiers of 
commercial law, from the Code Savary in 1673 to the Uniform Commercial Code of 1970, 
relied heavily on the lex mercatoria, developed by merchant courts. Bruce L. Benson, Evolution 
of Commercial Law, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 88 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 68. For example, previous law often granted higher probative status to the word of 
employers than to that of employees. 
 69. Notice that by the 17th century the common law had already developed the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, which enabled a court to declare void future or postponed interests in 
property that might vest outside a certain perpetuity period. The goal of this rule was to prevent 
land being tied up and encourage free markets.  
 70. Benito Arruñada, Property Enforcement as Organized Consent, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
401, 403–06 (2003). 
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created by the parties, whereas under a system of greater judicial 
discretion this private legal order would have been in danger.71 This 
fear drove the efforts of 19th century legislators to purge many 
dogmatic rules from received law, often rooted in Canon law, that 
were contrary to freedom of contract.72 A prominent example is the 
liberalization of credit transactions, which were still subject to 
substantial constraints, including the prohibition of interest and 
foreclosure.73 Similarly, they often prohibited the judge from 
reducing the amount of penal clauses contractually established to 
punish the debtor for default in paying back a loan.74 Most codes also 
derogated rules that had allowed courts to disregard some “unequal” 
contractual clauses on the basis of scholastic “just price” arguments, 
such as the doctrine of “lesion.”75 More importantly, the scope of 
 
 71. We ignore private legal order solutions, since we think they suffer intrinsic difficulties 
to become the legal order for a modern capitalist economy. The reasons for this are, first, 
because the reliance of private enforcement on group membership limits its effectiveness to 
intra-industry trade, often with a personal character; second, because they are only effective 
when state judges abstain from acting as appellate courts and they always remain threatened by 
this possibility (otherwise, private enforcement is only based on informal social sanctions, 
increasing its personal character); and, third, because in most of Europe, private solutions were 
applied in relatively minor areas of the economy—mainly the merchant courts, where they 
seemingly ruled without appeal. Benson, supra note 12, at 650. See also supra note 39. For an 
in-depth discussion of the ignored private solutions, see generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out 
of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Imminent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001); Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment and 
Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. POL. ECON. 745 (1994); Paul R. Milgrom 
et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and 
the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990); Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995). 
 72. Until the eighteenth century, for example, French laws against usury had the effect of 
denying short-term credits that were indispensable for commerce, industry, and banking. 
Borrowers and debtors then had to spend substantial recourses to circumvent the prohibition, 
which hindered the development of the financial market. Taylor, supra note 64, at 480. 
Understandably, a main goal of the Napoleonic Code was to empower contractual parties to act 
on their own behalf, protecting them from anybody, including judges, who could alter the terms 
of their agreement. UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 186–87 (1997). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Didier Danet, Does the Civil Code Matter?, 14 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 215, 218 (2002). 
 75. Ascribing the doctrine of lesion to “the civil law,” without warning of its removal or 
reduction by nineteenth century codifiers, as done in ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 191, 253 (2d ed. 1997), exemplifies the ambiguities that complicate the 
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“cause” as a necessary element of any enforceable contract was 
considerably reduced (by reversing the burden of proof, for instance), 
and even fully eliminated in the “abstract” transaction of the German 
Civil Code, as well as, more generally, in the laws of mortgages and 
bills of exchange.76 This pruning of the concept of cause curtailed 
notably the possibilities of constraining contractual freedom with 
moral principles that the Canonist interpretation of the original 
Roman concept had previously offered.  
Understandably, legislators also tried to shelter legal reform from 
any reactionary backlash, including the possibility that judges would 
exert their discretion to decide cases on the basis of abstract 
principles and against the new rules,77 thus rendering the reform 
ineffective and hindering development towards the market 
economy.78 Legislators, therefore, subordinated the judiciary to the 
law and to jurisprudence and restructured the professional career of 
judges.79  
 
comparisons between legal systems. For a detailed analysis, see JUAN MANUEL ABRIL 
CAMPOY, LA RESCISIÓN DEL CONTRATO POR LÉSION: ENFOQUE DOCTRINAL Y 
JURISPRUDENCIAL [THE RECISSION OF CONTRACTS FOR BREACH: A DOCTRINAL AND 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOCUS] (2003) (Spain).  
 76. On the principle of abstraction or Abstraktionsprinzip that is characteristic of German 
property law, see, for example, Jürgen Kohler, The Law of Rights in Rem, in INTRODUCTION TO 
GERMAN LAW 231 (W. F. Ebke & M. W. Finkin eds., 1996). 
 77. The legislators followed B. de Montesquieu’s theory that judges should simply be “the 
mouth that pronounces the words of the law” (L’ESPIRIT DES LOIS, 1748). Political scientists 
have gathered considerable evidence on how political views affect sentencing patterns. See, 
e.g., C. K. Rowland & Bridget Jeffery Todd, Where You Stand Depends on Who Sits: Platform 
Promises and Judicial Gatekeeping in the Federal District Courts, 53 J. POL. 175 (1991); Carol 
Ann Traut & Craig F. Emmert, Expanding the Integrated Model of Judicial Decision Making: 
The California Justices and Capital Punishment, 60 J. POL. 1166 (1998); and Mark A. Cohen, 
The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT’L. REV. L. & 
ECON. 13 (1992).  
 78. For example, Hayek, among many others, emphasizes that the revolutionaries’ distrust 
of judges and desire of controlling judicial discretion led to both creation of codes, and more 
formalized legal procedures. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960). 
This is confirmed by recent empirical evidence showing that civil law countries regulate the 
judicial process more heavily than common law countries. Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 
Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003). 
 79. Broadly speaking, judges in civil law countries are appointed just after law school and 
follow a civil service career, with promotions decided on the basis of either merit or seniority; 
whereas in common countries experienced attorneys are more often appointed for judgeships. 
See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does), 3 SUPREME COURT ECON. REV. 1 (1994); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and 
Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. L. REV. 1259 (2005). See Mark Ramseyer & 
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Consequently, not only were codes and statutes given priority as a 
source of law, but the production of binding precedents was allocated 
to the higher court of appeals, which was conceived, at least 
originally, more as a court-controlling body than as a proper court.80 
Its function was to supervise the legal interpretations given by lower 
courts, guaranteeing uniformity, making sentences predictable, and 
enhancing legal security.81 Furthermore, no court had powers to 
question the constitutionality of legislation.82 In the French model, 
even controlling the legality of governmental action was assigned to a 
quasi-governmental body, the Conseil d’État.83  
 
Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 13 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997) for an empirical analysis on judicial incentives in a career 
system typical of the civil law. 
 80. 
The preparation of draft bills was not the only task of the Conseil d’État in the 
legislative field. The institution also played a role in interpreting the law through acts 
which had a general impact. This function of interpreting legislation accentuated and 
reinforced the role played by the Conseil d’État in establishing the law. The first 
regulation of the Conseil d’État, dated 5 Nivôse, An VIII (26 December, 1799), in its 
article 11 provided for the Conseil d’État ‘to develop the substance of laws, when 
questions that have been put to the consuls are referred to it’. The declarations made 
by the Conseil in the context of this consultative work were known as avis du Conseil 
d’État (opinions of the Conseil d’Etat). After the Consulate, the Court of Cassation 
recognized these opinions as having the same autonomy, with regards to the courts, as 
a law itself. They were not all published however, as Napoleon did not always give his 
approval and only this approval could give these opinions of the Conseil d’État the 
force of law. 
Fondation Napoleon, Printed Working Documents of the Conseil d’Etat [1800–1814], 
http://www.napoleonica.org/us/ce/ce_mission.html (last visited May 2, 2008). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Take for example the Swiss Civil Code of 1907. Its first article clearly establishes that 
if no rule exists the judge should decide according to the hypothetical will of the legislator. 
Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch [ZGB], Code civil Suisse [Cc], Codice civile swizzero 
[Cc][Civil Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, RS 210, art. 1 (Switz.). 
 83.  
So, in spite of the constitutional rules and the difference, which was in principle 
absolute, between a consultative body and a body with the power to pass a law, the 
practice of the Consulate and the Empire shows that the consultative role of the 
Conseil d’Etat was extended in practice to a legislative role that went beyond that of 
the Legislative Body. 
Fondation Napoleon, supra note 80. 
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In parallel, the practice of purchasing judicial offices was 
abolished and judges were converted into civil servants.84 They 
started their judicial career young and inexperienced, by passing 
specific exams after law school.85 Even today their promotions and 
salaries increase with seniority and sometimes with discretionary 
governmental appointments to the higher courts and other public 
offices.86 This meant that judges could lose substantial quasi-rents if 
they opposed the government or, even worse, were expelled from 
their positions.87 Compliance was further constrained in some 
countries by modifying their liability, making judges personally 
liable if they decide contrary to the statutory law and formally 
established jurisprudence, and not to dominant doctrinal opinion as 
before.88 
In summation, our explanation of why pro-market reformers in 
civil law countries reduced the discretion of the judiciary lies in the 
fact that, in such countries, the transition to market economies was 
relatively more revolutionary and was generally not supported by 
Ancient Regime judges.89 Institutional change in England followed a 
relatively smooth, evolutionary process, which started much earlier 
and developed over a considerable time span, giving time and 
occasion for the judiciary to be cultured in the market order.90 In 
contrast, judiciaries in Continental Europe were structured with 
greater central control with a view to achieving and enforcing an 
intended change, for which judges were largely unprepared.91 
 
 84. Supra note 79. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. For a case of governmental interference see, for instance, Mark Ramseyer & Eric 
B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases? 95 
AM. POLIT. SC. REV. 331 (2001), who show that Japanese judges who acquit on the grounds of 
statutory or constitutional interpretation, often in politically charged cases, have worse careers 
following the acquittal. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., Ley de enjuiciamiento civil of 1881 (1881 Act of Civil Procedure), art. 903-
17. 
 89. ANTONIO GAMBARO, WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 686–91 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 90. See supra note 51. 
 91. The evolutionary versus revolutionary character of the transition was not the only 
historical accident having an influence in the adaptiveness of legal systems. Innovation in 
physical technology after the common law was entrenched may have also reduced the 
comparative advantage of judicial discretion. The conjecture is that in common law 
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D. Current Anti-Market Trends in the Western Legal System  
Both common and civil law experienced substantial 
transformations during the 20th century, such that jurisdictions 
pertaining to different legal traditions now show remarkable 
similarities in areas in which they are often supposed to differ. 
Considerable convergence has also taken place in fields in which 
legislation is more recent, such as consumer protection or financial 
regulation.92 These changes have been interpreted as consequences of 
a general social shift from a more individualistic economic and social 
order to a new kind of collectivism.93 This shift is consistent with our 
argument because it comes to satisfy an instinctive demand for 
insurance at a time when the political system was more willing to 
supply it. Let us see why.  
First, from the perspective of evolutionary psychology, the high 
level of insecurity and, mainly, the exogenous risks generated by the 
two World Wars and the Great Depression, activated demand for 
“sharing” solutions, introducing all sorts of welfare mechanisms and 
creating the mixed-economy systems that have characterized Western 
societies since the second part of the 20th century.94 Even if the 
antecedents of the welfare state go back to the fourth quarter of the 
19th century, they arguably did not reach a substantial share of GDP 
 
jurisdictions, the market economy was established before the emergence of national markets, 
which mostly waited until the development of railroads. Most codification in Europe took place 
when, thanks to the impact of railroads, it was already clear that markets would become much 
wider in scope. Understandably, legislatures strive to provide unified legal standards for the 
whole of the national market, as local rule-making makes less sense after the development of 
national markets. 
 92. See Gambaro, supra note 89, at 686, on the more revolutionary character of changes 
in the civil law and on the synchronicity between common law and civil law in the second half 
of the 20th century on issues of women’s rights, environmental protection, consumer and 
corporate law. 
 93. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 34 (1983); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 14 (2d ed. 
1985). See also Alston, supra note 36 and textual section on “Ecological Rationality and the 
Unnaturalness of Markets” above. 
 94. The Roosevelt Week, TIME, July 11, 1932. “Throughout the nation men and women, 
forgotten in the political philosophy of the Government, look to us here for guidance and for 
more equitable opportunity to share in the distribution of national wealth . . . I pledge myself to 
a new deal for the American people. This is more than a political campaign. It is a call to arms.” 
(emphasis added). 
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until well into the 20th century. The weight of the state in the 
economy also differs substantially across countries, but these current 
cross-country differences seem much smaller than historical 
differences between the present and the 19th century. Evolutionary 
anthropology tells us that ancestral human beings relied on social 
sharing structures for coping with exogenous risks.95 Understandably, 
the World Wars and the Great Depression might have triggered a 
backlash against the free functioning of the market and the 
introduction of all sorts of state controls and social insurance, and this 
conjecture finds some support in the parallel events that took place 
almost simultaneously in countries under civil and common law, as 
interventionist rules have since then substantially constrained 
freedom of contract in both systems.96 
Second, changes in the structure of the political system at the end 
of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, like the 
introduction of universal suffrage and the development of organized 
interest groups—from big firms to unions, moved most countries 
away from an elitist model of democracy, thus introducing cognitive 
biases into the rule-making institutions, which previous governing 
elites had learned to suppress. Whatever the direction of causality, the 
cognitive gap between legislators and judges with respect to anti-
market biases was likely to diminish substantially or even disappear 
as a consequence of the change in the political system that 
transformed political leaders into political agents.97 Political systems 
 
 95.  See Elizabeth Cashdan, Egalitarianism Among Hunters and Gatherers, 82 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 116 (1980); Elizabeth Cashdan, Hunters and Gatherers: Economic Behavior 
in Bands, in ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 21 (Stuart Plattner ed., 1989); Cosmides & Tooby, 
supra note 27; Hillard Kaplan & Kim Hill, Food Sharing Among Ache Foragers: Tests of 
Explanatory Hypotheses, 26 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 223 (1985); Hillard Kaplan et al., Risk, 
Foraging, and Food Sharing Among the Ache, in RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN TRIBAL AND 
PEASANT ECONOMICS 107 (Elizabeth A. Cashdan ed., 1990).  
 96. This does not imply that the solution of the 20th century, characterized by constrained 
freedom and imposed redistribution, is poorly adapted. On the contrary, these economies have 
been successful in terms of sustained growth rates and social stability. Furthermore, some 
experimental works support the claim that stable competitive interaction among humans 
requires some degree of redistribution.  
 97.  For an account that considers the potential influence of evolutionary maladaptation in 
the legislative market, see PAUL H. RUBIN, DARWINIAN POLITICS: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGIN 
OF FREEDOM ch. 7 (2002); Paul H. Rubin, How Humans Make Political Decisions, 41 
JURIMETRICS J. 337 (2001); Paul H. Rubin, The State of Nature and the Evolution of Political 
Preferences, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 50 (2001). 
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became, as a consequence, willing to supply “sharing” solutions, 
even if they were contrary to freedom of contract, market order, and 
long-term economic prosperity.  
1. Changes in Common Law 
We argue that these processes are behind the changes in the fabric 
of American common law, which was substantially altered by 
decisions by both legislators and judges.  
At the legislative level, the “New Deal” of the 1930s marked a 
radical turning point. The Legislature moved away from the 
principles of freedom of contract, introduced wide-ranging regulation 
and administrative oversight of many private economic activities that 
affected contractual and property rights, and developed an enormous 
body of administrative law.98 It brought extensive mandatory 
legislation in fields of law that had hardly existed before, like labor 
relations, securities, public housing, social security, and 
environmental protection.99 
The New Deal was also a defining moment for the United States 
Supreme Court, whose will was twisted to endorse the 
constitutionality of the New Deal package. Crucial elements of the 
Constitution were reinterpreted, reducing individuals’ freedom of 
contract in many areas, from labor relations to the issuance of 
financial securities. Consequently, the Supreme Court lost some of its 
authority as a guardian of the Constitution together with much of its 
capacity to override the interpretation of regulations issued by 
governmental agencies. Courts were able to impose procedural 
restrictions on administrative agencies but were prevented from 
achieving substantive results.100 Even though the Supreme Court has 
always reinterpreted constitutional provisions in the context of 
contemporary society, the major change introduced by the New Deal 
remains a shift to a more redistributive social contract conceived in 
 
 98. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Edward L. 
Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 401 
(2003); Manne, supra note 11; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 405, 462 (1989).  
 99. Berman, supra note 93, at 34. 
 100. Manne, supra note 11, at 24. 
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the midst of the Great Depression. Even though researchers disagree 
on the extent to which this breaks with traditional constitutional 
jurisprudence,101 the fact is that in United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.,102 the Supreme Court placed the right of property owners in a 
subordinate category entitled to a lesser degree of protection. This 
outcome looks more like a considerable doctrinal shift than a mere 
adaptation to the specific circumstances. 
In addition, judicial interpretation, which for centuries had been 
supportive of freedom of contract, started to constrain it.103 This 
happened, for example, with respect to product liability in the U.S. 
after MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. in 1916, Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. in 1960104 and the application of so-called 
“enterprise liability,” making manufacturers absolutely liable for all 
accidents arising from the use of their products.105 This practice 
motivates carelessness by consumers.106 With similar dubious 
arguments of market power, inequality, and unfairness since the 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. case of 1965, some U.S. 
courts have also been applying the doctrine of “unconscionability,” 
refusing to enforce clauses that offend the courts’ conscience and 
coming, in the broadest interpretation of the doctrine, amazingly 
close to using raw versions of the scholastic arguments of Canon law. 
Something similar is happening in labor law with the tendency of 
common law courts to require employers to show “just cause” when 
terminating a contract that includes the default clause of termination-
at-will.107  
 
 101. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998). 
 102. 303 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 103.  For a summary of the parallel change in legal doctrine and education with the 
breakdown of the Austinian model, extremely respectful of precedent, and its substitution for 
Legal Realism in the first part of the twentieth century, see Manne, supra note 11, at 20–29.  
 104. Benson, supra note 67, at 92. 
 105. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985). 
 106.  See Manne, supra note 11, at 35 (mentioning the “creation of an edifice of ‘implied 
warranties’” and the “adoption of strict liability in the 1960s”). 
 107. Max Schanzenbach, Exception to Employment at Will: Raising Firing Costs or 
Enforcing Life-Cycle Contracts?, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 470 (2003). 
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2. Changes in Civil Law 
Civil law has experienced similar changes, with only minor 
differences in timing and intensity. In the legislative area, changes 
have abounded since the 1920s,108 when corporatism with diverse 
political agendas but a common anti-market flavor gained power in 
several European countries. As a result, state intervention grew in all 
kinds of private activities. Parliaments were transformed from 
discoverers of permanent law into representations of heterogeneous 
private interests.109 They enacted many transient and mandatory rules 
in new legislation, in fields similar to those legislated in the New 
Deal, a process that was reinforced after World War II with the 
extension of welfare states. Mandatory legislative intervention of old 
codified law, such as contracts and property, was initially limited but 
exploded in the 1960s and 1970s. The increased legislative activity 
converted what was once thought to be a coherent whole into a mass 
of ad hoc and frequently contradictory rules.110  
It might be argued that changes against freedom of contract in 
civil law countries were made easier because these countries entered 
the 20th century with more powerful legislatures, unconstrained by 
the rule-making capacity of the common law judiciary. Comparing 
end results in Europe and the US seems to confirm this interpretation, 
because interventionism grew more in Europe. The British case, 
however, throws a doubt by illustrating that, first, the common law is 
not sheltered against heavy socialization and, second, that a strong 
legislative power may be the right tool for reinvigorating the market, 
more so than the relatively discretional but unsophisticated judiciary 
that contributed to rule out freedom of contract in common law 
countries by means of judicial activism.  
In many civil law jurisdictions, changes in the position of judges 
have increased their rulemaking powers. First, control over civil law 
judges has been relaxed and they now enjoy more freedom. Some of 
the constraints still active in the 19th century, such as personal 
 
 108.  The second wave of codification, which started with the twentieth century, is often 
considered much less pro-market than the first wave—for example in the treatment of lesion. 
ABRIL CAMPOY, supra note 75.  
 109. SCHMITT, supra note 37. 
 110. BERMAN, supra note 93, at 35–38. 
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liability, also have been lifted. Moreover, judicial congestion partially 
frees them from the implicit control of appeals, which have become 
much more costly because delays have increased with the growing 
opportunity cost of time. Lastly, the previously mentioned change in 
the nature of parliament has explicitly enhanced the position of 
judges, especially when constitutions safeguard the positive rights of 
some groups (civil servants, churches, unions, etc.), constraining 
legislative discretion.111 This is clear in constitutional courts, which 
were designed to control the legislature, and whose powers were 
reinforced after the Second World War.112 But lower level courts now 
also enjoy greater discretion in some jurisdictions, as they now can 
start proceedings at the constitutional court by questioning the 
constitutionality of legislation. Similarly, within the European Union, 
lower courts can initiate a similar proceeding at the European Court 
of Justice when they believe that national law contradicts EU law. If 
our cognitive argument on judicial failure is correct, this greater 
discretion of civil law courts will likely be used to constrain freedom 
of contract, unless the judges achieve a better understanding of 
market mechanisms.  
IV. A CRITIQUE OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS  
Our interpretation of 19th century civil law as an adaptive top-
down introduction of the institutions supporting market exchange has 
important consequences for the arguments developed in debates on 
the comparative efficiency and performance of common law versus 
civil law. The first of these debates started when part of the American 
“law and economics” school argued in favor of the efficiency of the 
solutions being used in 19th century common law. Later, the quest 
for institutional explanations of differences in economic performance 
has led to quantitative comparisons of multiple performance 
indicators across legal systems. Even though both of these 
explanations involve evolutionary arguments and path-dependency, 
 
 111. SCHMITT, supra note 37.  
 112. For a theory about the role of the constitutional court in controlling legislation that 
might reduce the protection of rights by the state, see ROBERT ALEXY, TEORÍA DE LOS 
DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES [THEORY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS] (1993) (Spain). 
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they differ in an important way from our hypotheses because they do 
not consider the possibility of adaptation to local historical 
circumstances as the main force behind divergent legal systems. 
Moreover, these alternative explanations fail to prove the universal 
superiority of common law arrangements which many of them more 
or less explicitly advocate. Consequently, their explanations can lead 
to flawed policy when they neglect local circumstances that might 
strongly limit the feasibility of any legal reform.  
A. The Efficiency Debate 
1. The Efficiency of the Common Law 
The efficiency of common law was first suggested by Posner, 
based on the metaphor that the decentralized creation of common law 
mimicked how the market worked, leading judges to unconsciously 
pursue an efficiency standard.113 This hypothesis has been 
successfully used to explain many common law rules, such as those 
concerning negligence, contributory negligence, strict liability, 
restitution, and collateral source, to name just a few.114 For instance, 
Landes and Posner illustrate the argument by examining the 
application of the Hand Formula, a special type of cost and benefit 
analysis applied in the field of torts, and conclude that judges do 
actually, even though not necessarily consciously, use this method 
when assessing liability, and thus take efficiency-enhancing 
decisions.115 This kind of argument has been criticized, however, for 
its lack of verifiability. In particular, there is no evidence that judges 
consciously perform this calculation. Furthermore, the information 
needed to apply the rule is not readily available. In addition, even if a 
rule in common law is shown to be efficient, it does not follow that it 
is the common law system that has produced such efficiency, as 
many of these rules that were developed in older legal systems116 are 
 
 113. Posner, supra note 7.  
 114. Id. 
 115. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT 
LAW (1987). 
 116. Brian Simpson, English Common Law, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 15, at 57. 
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also applied in civil law jurisdictions117 or, when different, 
differences are functional and fit well into other design features of 
legal systems.118 
The efficiency hypothesis has also been grounded in more detailed 
models of the judicial process. Adapting Harold Demsetz’s seminal 
argument on property rights,119 Paul Rubin argued that inefficient 
rules tend to be abolished as an unintended by-product of litigation 
between self-interested parties who share a common interest in 
changing the rule.120 To encompass cases in which parties do not 
share such a common interest, the argument has been extended to 
model the common law as an evolutionary process.121 Litigation, 
however, is often unable to produce the same legal rules as those that 
the parties would have introduced if they had explicitly agreed ex 
ante on the issue being litigated ex post, because litigation does not 
aggregate all parties’ interests and can therefore aspire to achieve 
only local, instead of global, efficiency.122 Taking into account this 
critique and extending the argument, Rubin argued that ingrained, 
albeit different, mechanisms drive both common law and civil law to 
efficiency. He claimed that this drive to efficiency lasted well into the 
19th century and that the susceptibility to interest group pressure that 
characterizes the later evolution of rule-making institutions corrupted 
both common law and civil law.123 This idea has been explored 
further by Crew and Twight,124 Bailey and Rubin,125 and Osborne,126 
among others. However, it remains silent on why the two centuries 
 
 117. Michael Faure, Tort Liability in France: An Introductory Economic Analysis, in 6 THE 
ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS SERIES 169 (Bruno Deffains & Thierry Kirat eds., 
2001). 
 118. Rubin, supra note 5. 
 119. Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 
(1967). 
 120. Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). 
 121. Katz, supra note 2; Priest, supra note 2; Terrebonne, supra note 2. 
 122. Richard E. Wagner, Common Law, Statute Law and Economic Efficiency, in 1 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 313 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 123. Rubin, supra note 5. 
 124. Michael Crew & Charlotte Twight, On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice 
Perspective, 66 PUB. CHOICE 15 (1990). 
 125. Martin Bailey & Paul H. Rubin, A Positive Theory of Legal Change, 14 INT’L REV. L. 
& ECON. 467 (1994). 
 126. Evan Osborne, What’s Yours Is Mine: Rent-Seeking and the Common Law, 111 PUB. 
CHOICE 399 (2002). 
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differed so drastically in terms of the extent of rent-seeking, 
something that we have conjectured may have been a reaction against 
exogenous risks.127 
Furthermore, common law understood as judge-made law may be 
imperfect for deeper reasons. Its nature is retrospective and thus 
unsuitable for creating completely new rules or for making rapid 
legal changes. As with any design produced in an evolutionary 
process, it suffers path dependency because innovations are 
introduced not by designing them from scratch but by tinkering with 
a received solution. Paraphrasing Tooby and Cosmides, common law 
then evolves “like the proverbial ship that is always at sea. The ship 
can never go into dry dock for a major overhaul; whatever 
improvements are made must be implemented plank by plank, so that 
the ship does not sink.”128 Statutory law, in contrast, is produced in a 
more purposeful, even though not necessarily superior, process, 
benefiting from planning and foresight, and is less constrained by the 
previous legal order. It suffers from rent seeking, but, as we have 
seen above, the severity of this rent-seeking problem varies greatly 
and the evolutionary processes in common law are not at all free of 
their own versions of it, as in the case of politically motivated judges, 
who implement their own version of morality.129 Even Richard 
Posner concedes that “legislative law-making is apt to be more 
efficient than judicial law-making” because the litigation of cases 
often fails to raise the pertinent questions for initiation of a legal 
reform.130 As argued by Wagner, common law can probably pass the 
test of local efficiency but is bound to fail the test of global 
efficiency.131  
Lastly, the claim that case law is more efficient than statutory law 
remains unproven because most of the discussion has been on the 
internal consistency of common law and not on its advantages with 
respect to civil law. Internal consistency, however, is not exclusive to 
 
 127. For an extensive review of the literature on the efficiency of judge-made law, see Paul 
H. Rubin, Judge-Made Law, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 
543. 
 128. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 26, at 60. 
 129. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). 
 130. Posner, supra note 7, at 569.  
 131. Wagner, supra note 122, at 315. 
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common law, as many rules in civil law also seem to reflect or lead to 
efficiency.132 Robert Cooter, for example, suggests that the efficiency 
of common law depends on the enactment of efficient customs by 
judges.133 This is as much a characteristic of common law as it is of 
civil law. According to this argument, judges make common law 
efficient when they find customary law and raise it to the level of 
law. However, the selection of social norms is also frequently carried 
out in the codification process. For example, the most successful U.S. 
code, The Uniform Commercial Code, was built by identifying and 
systematizing the best business practices, and most of the rest of the 
common law of contracts has also been codified in the Restatement 
of Contracts published by the American Law Institute and state 
statutes revising the Statute of Frauds.134 This argument leads us to 
the debate of the efficiency of statutory law.  
2. The Efficiency of the Civil Law 
Work asserting the economic efficiency of the common law often 
suggests, more or less implicitly, that statutory law does not achieve 
the same degree of efficiency. However, civil law also strives toward 
efficiency through its sources of rules, legislation and judicial 
activity.135 
Legislation may produce superior rules because its centralization 
favors standardization and innovation. Industrial organization shows 
that markets do not always provide universal standards and do not 
fully guarantee that the surviving standard is the best. A possible 
solution is an industrial agreement or other kind of coordination 
mechanism guaranteeing the compatibility of all elements of the 
network. By analogy, Harnay sees legal codes as standards within a 
social network, providing legal coordination in a setting of adopting 
 
 132. Faure, supra note 117, at 179; Harnay, supra note 16. 
 133. Robert Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of 
Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994). 
 134. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 75, at 205, 378. 
 135. In a survey among members of the American Law and Economics Association, it was 
found that eighty-four percent of respondents believed that common law is generally efficient 
and that forty-two percent thought that it is more efficient than civil law. Moorhouse et al., 
Economics and the Law: Where is There Consensus?, 43 AM. ECONOMIST 81 (1999).  
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externalities.136 Codified law can then avoid the emergence of 
inefficient legal rules in the process of decentralized litigation that 
characterizes common law systems. The argument has been applied 
to explain codification as a conscious effort to systematize and 
organize previous statutes and customs.137 Civil law is also thought to 
have some advantages, prospectively being more innovative than 
common law. It is grounded on legal rules, which may be easier to 
create than social norms.138 Although this argument obviously begs 
the question as to whether or when this creativity is desirable, it also 
indicates that civil law has the potential to be flexible despite being 
often perceived as rigid.  
The concept that civil law is more concerned with distribution 
than with efficiency has also been opposed by pointing out the extent 
to which civil law principles rely on a logic of economic 
efficiency.139 For example, even though French tort law does not use 
a Learned Hand test to evaluate the standard of care, it does not 
exclude the use of cost and benefit analysis. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether judicial practice strays away from economic 
efficiency and favors redistribution more in civil than in common 
law. For example, it has been argued that civil law tends to apply 
strict liability when this application is more consistent with 
compensating victims than with economic efficiency, perhaps 
reflecting different social priorities.140 However, the scope of strict 
liability has probably also been taken in common law to inefficient 
extremes.141  
The capacity of civil law judges to modify and adapt inefficient 
legal rules is also greater than it might be imagined because judges 
retain some normative capacity.142 It has often been observed that, 
 
 136. Harnay, supra note 16. 
 137. See, e.g., Jean-Michel Josselin & Alain Marciano, The Making of the French Civil 
Code: An Economic Interpretation, 14 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 193 (2002).  
 138. Nuno Garoupa, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Systems in Civil Law Countries, in 
6 THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS SERIES 199 (Bruno Deffains & Thierry Kirat 
eds., 2001). 
 139. Faure, supra note 117. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Priest, supra note 105. 
 142. Theodor Viehweg von Beck (TOPIK UND JURISPRUDENZ 1953) argues that civil law 
judges have freedom to interpret the law. 
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when the efficiency of a codified rule is in doubt, civil law courts end 
up circumventing it, usually by stretching the interpretation of 
flexible standards such as “good faith,” “reasonably,” “fairly,” and so 
on. This happened, for instance, in areas as diverse as encroachments, 
ostensible possession, and formal contract requirements. For 
example, according to the Spanish Civil Code, encroached 
constructions should be demolished if the two neighboring owners do 
not reach an agreement, which would be inefficient in cases of minor 
good-faith encroachments; consequently, the jurisprudence came to 
enforce a liability rule.143 It is also common for land registration laws 
to deny property (that is, real or in rem) status to mere possession. 
However, case law often interprets good faith requirements 
expansively, considering ostensible possession as proof of bad faith 
on the part of a third party acquiring the property from a registered 
owner without possession.144 As a last example, the French Civil 
Code’s requirement of written form for debts in the area of business 
contracting was rapidly abrogated by judges.145 
It therefore seems clear that efficiency and departures from it are 
not exclusively a common law or a civil law trait146 but are responses 
to deeper causes. Ugo Mattei suggests, for instance, that changes in 
the role of both common and civil law courts have resulted in the 
substitution of social organization by contract for what he describes 
as “government by judges”.147 The result of this shift and the risks 
involved in it show remarkable similarities across legal traditions. In 
civil law countries, jurisprudence soon reintroduced moralistic views 
by interpreting, more or less freely, the original “intent” of the 
legislative rule maker. In a recent example, courts’ rulings on cases 
 
 143. Cándido Paz-Ares, Principio de eficiencia y derecho privado [Principle of Efficiency 
and Private Rights], in 3 ESTUDIOS EN HOMENAJE A M. BROSETA PONT [STUDIES IN HOMAGE 
TO M. BROSETA PONT] 2843, 2860–65 (1995) (Spain). 
 144.  The judicial proclivity to transform “crystal” property rules into “muddy” liability 
rules, was originally analyzed in common law by Rose. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in 
Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988). But it is also present in civil law. See generally 
Arruñada, supra note 70. 
 145.  Danet, supra note 74. Even if this judicial overruling of statutes is a powerful force, 
we are not arguing that it equates the position of civil law judges to that of their common law 
counterparts. Furthermore, such overruling is not always efficient, as shown by the judicial 
treatment of possessory rights.  
 146. Rubin, supra note 5. 
 147. MATTEI, supra note 73. 
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involving workers’ dismissals in Italy have been shown to be 
influenced by conditions in the local labor market. The probability of 
a ruling in the worker’s favor increases with the unemployment rate 
in the court’s jurisdiction, which is consistent with greater 
consideration of “fairness” in such rulings.148 However, similar 
events take place in most areas of common law. Even U.S. federal 
judges have been severely criticized for implementing their own 
views and disregarding the constitutional and statutory constraints 
they are supposed to be bound by.149  
B. The Comparative Performance Discussion 
The debate on the efficiency of legal systems, confined for 
decades to law and economics, has recently reached wider audiences, 
when some related hypotheses started to be tested empirically by 
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Paul 
Mahoney, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny.150 These works 
classify a sample of countries according to the historical origin of 
their legal system as common law or civil law. These studies 
examined French, German, and Scandinavian civil law, and the 
origins in former Socialist countries; and then using statistical 
regression, tested the explanatory power of these “legal origin” 
variables on diverse indicators of countries’ institutional and 
economic performance, ranging from stock ownership concentration 
to economic growth.  
The first studies explored the relevance that this classification 
criterion had on the development of financial markets and 
companies’ ownership dispersion.151 Five-scale indices of investor 
and shareholder protection were elaborated after inspecting the 
commercial code and bankruptcy regulation in each country. These 
 
 148. Andrea Ichino et al., Are Judges Biased by Law Market Conditions?, 47 EUR. ECON. 
REV. 913 (2003). 
 149. BORK, supra note 129. 
 150. Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2002); Djankov et 
al., supra note 77; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 
1131 (1997); La Porta et al., supra note 3; La Porta et al., supra note 41; Mahoney, supra note 
4. 
 151. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 
(1997); La Porta et al., supra note 3. 
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were assumed to reflect the degree of legal protection that the law 
was providing to minority investors. A statistically significant 
positive correlation was found between the shareholder and investor 
protection, on the one hand, and the common law tradition, on the 
other. The analysis was later extended in a series of works that 
showed significant correlations between belonging to a particular 
legal system and the measured level of regulation, property rights 
protection, the efficiency of government, the level of political 
freedom, economic growth, and judicial independence.152 The punch-
line in all these works is that the civil law tradition and, in particular, 
its French version, shows consistently worse performance than the 
common law tradition.153  
This line of research is valuable because it is a pioneer effort in 
quantifying differences in performance across the legal institutions 
that sustain modern economies, and this motivates further discussion 
and allows it to proceed in a more systematic, although some would 
claim distorted, fashion. However, it suffers substantial weaknesses 
related to measurement difficulties, selection bias, and questionable 
causation.  
First, measurement is only as valuable as its accuracy, and 
measuring institutions is bound with methodological difficulties. 
Thus, most findings are based on indices that capture only a few of 
many relevant dimensions, as the index of shareholders rights in La 
Porta et al., which does not distinguish between the mandatory or 
default character of the rules, a major oversight if they are to be 
properly understood.154 In addition, they measure shareholder rights 
along dimensions that do not necessarily capture the real degree of 
protection. For example, their index considers the fact that German 
shareholders cannot vote by mail as a shortcoming of German 
corporate law, disregarding the fact that most German shareholders 
send their instructions by mail to their banks and that banks do 
vote.155 In fact, if, as shown by Spamann, the “Anti-director Rights 
 
 152. Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13608 (2007). 
 153. Id. 
 154. La Porta et al., supra note 3. 
 155. Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002). 
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Index” from La Porta et al.156 is consistently coded, there are no 
differences between common and civil law countries’ practices.157 
Moreover, it is argued that severe endogeneity problems are present 
in later works, starting with Djankov et al., where new variable 
definitions are used for the Anti-director Rights Index.158 The 
problem is even worse, however, for what is lacking is a global 
measure of institutional performance that distinguishes between 
institutional conditions and outcomes, and takes into account 
interactions among a number of institutions, which determines what 
we define as a present-day common law or civil law jurisdiction.159  
Second, even if performances were perfectly measured, their 
comparisons suffer from an intrinsic self-selection problem because 
actual observed levels of performance result from those choices that 
were effectively taken in the past, and we lack information on their 
alternatives (‘baseline difference’ in the taxonomy provided by 
Przeworski).160 If we recognize that not all legal systems perform 
well in all contexts, the relevant comparison is between the 
performance of the chosen option and that of its alternatives, but 
these alternative performances are by definition never observed. For 
example, even if someone demonstrates that the economic 
performance of the U.S. is better than that of France because France 
has a civil law system, this would not prove that it was a mistake for 
 
 156. La Porta et al., supra note 3. 
 157. Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-
Director Rights Index’ Under Consistent Coding, Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., 
and Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 7 (Mar. 2006). 
 158. Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11883 (2005), available at http://post.economics.harvard. 
edu/faculty/shleifer/papers/selfdeal.nov.pdf. 
 159.  Some steps toward more detailed analysis have already been taken but their results 
are not free from the biases we outline here. See, e.g., Daron Acemoglu & Simeon Johnson, 
Unbundling Institutions, 113 J. POL. ECON. 949 (2005) (showing a statistical relationship 
between growth and protection of property rights against state expropriation but not between 
growth and the quality of contracting institutions, a variable that other works link to legal 
origin); Daron Acemoglu et al., Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making 
of the Modern World Income Distribution, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1231–32 (2002) (defending the 
primary importance of local conditions for the development of strong property rights 
institutions); Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. 
COMP. ECON. 653, 655 (2003) (defending the importance of the legal system’s adaptability to 
evolving economic conditions).  
 160. Adam Przeworski, Institutions Matter?, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 527, 537 (2004). 
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the French to mold their Ancient Regime legal system in the direction 
of what is now known as civil law. To show that such a move was a 
mistake, one would have to compare the actual performance of 
France with the performance France would have exhibited under 
common law. This problem could be solved if we could observe 
cases in which countries choose their legal system randomly, and 
some research relies on ill-justified claims along these lines.161  
More generally, advancing causation arguments are especially 
dangerous in the absence of theory on the function of the specific 
institution under analysis. For example, concluding from a correlation 
that concentrated ownership is due to allegedly weak legal protection 
of investors’ rights might look intuitively correct but it is 
ungrounded. Specifically, when dealing with institutions of 
considerable complexity such as legal systems, it might not be 
possible to hold all other variables constant. As Roe shows, a 
complex mix of economic, social, and political conditions affects and 
is affected by managerial agency costs and determines the degree of 
ownership dispersion.162 Something similar happens with a recurrent 
omission in this literature: that civil law is grounded more on ex ante 
legal enforcement and gatekeeping while common law relies more on 
ex post judicial control of transactions that are freer ex ante. Given its 
reliance on ex ante control, civil law tends to require more mandatory 
procedures for most contracts. Consequently, comparisons of the 
complexity and cost of transactions across both legal systems is 
 
 161.  In particular, La Porta et al. claim that their studies do not suffer endogeneity 
because, in most cases, the actual origin of the legal system is imposed by conquest. La Porta et 
al., supra note 3, at 1126; La Porta et al., supra note 41, at 264–65. This is doubtful, however, 
because it is not applicable to either colonizing powers or to many former colonies, which often 
enacted their codes long after independence—in the case of former Spanish colonies, many 
decades later (and, by the way, choosing a perplexing mix of Spanish legal institutions and 
American political institutions). In addition, even when introducing new legal institutions, there 
was a choice of system and the decision was often to delay application to the colonies, 
implicitly opting to temporarily maintain the older system, which provided greater judicial 
discretion. Furthermore, as a version of this self-selection problem, the legal origin variables 
fail to consider the indigenous legal institutions. Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic 
Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003). The prior 
strength of indigenous institutions, which made introducing Western law unnecessary, more 
costly, and less effective, has also often been disregarded as an explanatory factor. See 
Acemoglu et al., supra note 159 (regarding the potentially negative effect of pre-colonial 
institutions in long-run economic growth).  
 162. Roe, supra note 155, at 265–69. 
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subject to a grave doubt. Similarly, the methodology of the “Doing 
Business” initiative computes only the mandatory steps necessary to 
incorporate a company, instead of computing the standard steps, 
assuming that the founders of a company undertake all necessary 
procedures by themselves, at no cost, unless it is mandatory to have 
an external party involved.163 Its evaluation of national institutions is 
therefore biased in favor of those countries with minimal mandatory 
intervention: probably, those relying on ex post legal control, for 
which “Doing Business” assumed entrepreneurs get legal help for 
free. In addition, the possible effect of ex ante intervention in 
reducing legal costs ex post is ignored.164 
In the same way, legal systems are imbedded into a complex 
network of political structures and social preferences that cannot be 
studied in isolation. Apparently La Porta et al. do study them in 
isolation when they take as a symptom of inefficiency of the legal 
procedure their finding that courts in civil law countries are slower to 
decide a case of eviction of a tenant or collection of a bounced check. 
Suggested inefficacies, however, are difficult to substantiate without 
considering factors such as the incidence of these events, the 
complementary enforcement mechanisms that are at work, and the 
costs incurred in each system for a comparable level of quality.  
Within this literature, the superior economic performance of 
common law countries has been attributed not only to the statutory 
protection of property rights but also to the greater judicial 
independence supposedly enjoyed by common law judges.165 
However, the benefits of greater judicial independence and, as a 
consequence, the inferred relationship with economic performance 
have been severely questioned in a period where politically-
motivated judges implement their notion of fairness and morality in 
an institutional setting in which they are not accountable, to a 
considerable degree, to anybody.166  
 
 163. Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1, 2 (2002); WORLD 
BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2004: UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 105, 106–07 (2004). 
 164. BENITO ARRUÑADA, LA FORMALIZACIÓN DE LA EMPRESA [THE FORMALIZATION OF 
ENTERPRISE] (forthcoming 2008) (Spain). 
 165. Rafael La Porta et al., Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445, 464 
(2004). 
 166. BORK, supra note 129, at 4–5. 
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Lastly, causation is also in doubt when superior performance is 
attributed to common law in legal fields which are based on statutory 
law everywhere. This happens not only in corporate law, but also in 
regulation and administrative law, as well as with some specific 
indicators, like eviction time. With this in mind, it is unsurprising that 
these legal origin variables also “explain” such phenomena as sports 
success,167 showing once more that correlation does not imply 
causation. 
C. The Need for Further Detail  
More generally, both the efficiency and performance debates 
opposing common and civil law have been formulated at a high level 
of abstraction. This may lead to a focus on ambiguous categories and 
reach mistaken conclusions. This abstraction takes place both 
vertically and horizontally. 
Vertically, because the various “civil law” labels are defined by 
country and, are therefore applied to related but separate and 
historically variable phenomena, such as statutory, codified, and 
systematic law versus case law, mandatory rules versus default rules, 
judicial dependence versus judicial discretion, and even rigid versus 
flexible rules of judicial procedure. These dimensions are better seen 
as variables in institutional design. All legal systems use them as 
ingredients but mix them in different proportions and manage them 
differently through history. Comparison among systems should aim 
to consider the weight of each ingredient, and their 
interdependencies. In doing so, the analysis should ideally 
incorporate the institutional determinants that lie beyond the legal 
system and frequently are found in the nature of the political 
process,168 as well as wider economic factors relevant in specific 
 
 167. West finds that FIFA rankings of national soccer teams correlate in a statistically 
significant manner with the legal origins a country belongs to. Mark West, Legal Determinants 
of World Cup Success (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 02-009, 2002).  
 168. Jürgen G. Backhaus, Efficient Statute Law, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 15, at 24; Wagner, supra note 122, at 313; Richard E. 
Wagner, Crafting Social Rules: Common Law vs. Statute Law, Once Again, 3 CONST. POL. 
ECON. 381 (1992).  
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fields of law, such as property, expected number of transactions, risk 
of political opportunism, and regulatory consistency.169 
Something similar happens horizontally, as legal systems often 
adopt structures pertaining to foreign traditions. This is also clear in 
the field of property law, in which legal traditions do not explain the 
adoption of the most relevant institutions. For example, until recently 
England had a system of private transactions akin to that of the 
Romans, but moved in the last century to the German system of 
registration, which is the same as Australia and most of Canada. Most 
of the U.S., however, introduced a system of publicity by recording 
that is typically French.170 Similarly, the numerus clausus of property, 
in rem rights are now almost unrelated to the common versus civil 
law divide. It remains to be documented to what extent this 
institutional cross-breeding also happens in other fields of law.  
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is time now to present some policy considerations, which aim to 
be pertinent for the unsolved problem of how to build market 
institutions in transition and developing economies.  
In previous parts we argue that the evolution of both common and 
the civil law in the 19th century was instrumental in protecting 
freedom of contract and developing market economies. Furthermore, 
we explain the different degrees of discretion granted to courts in 
both systems as optimal adaptations to particular circumstances, 
partially to the availability of judges favorable to the market in 
England and their lack in the Continent. In this way, greater judicial 
discretion in classic common law courts emerges more as an 
historical and perhaps unique exception than as a replicable solution.  
This casts an additional doubt on the normative interpretations of 
some results on the efficiency and performance of legal systems, 
which, asserting the superiority of the common law, seemingly 
recommend applying it. We have sketched above why such 
superiority is open to question and likely to depend on environmental 
factors. But, more clearly, even if the common law were shown to be 
 
 169. Arruñada, supra note 70. 
 170. Id. 
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superior now, the normative consequences of such superiority might 
be insignificant. Both common and civil law were probably well 
adapted to their original circumstances. Those creating the 
institutions of the market in Continental Europe did not opt for 
constraining judicial discretion to control the market but to protect it.  
In line with this contingent interpretation, our analysis does not 
advise any specific system for transition and developing economies 
in general but instead suggests that institutional development and 
academic research should aim at identifying the contextual 
circumstances which affect the costs and benefits of the different 
solutions. The problems of these economies may, in some cases, be 
more similar to those faced on the Continent at the demise of the 
Ancient Regime than to those enjoyed by England more or less at the 
same time. If so, restraining judicial discretion may be now necessary 
in developing economies to guarantee freedom of contract.  
In addition to the need for adaptation, our analysis suggests that 
the creation of market friendly institutions in transition and 
developing economies would benefit from examining the presence or 
absence of a cognitive gap similar to the one alleged between 
European legislators and judges in the 19th century. The lack of 
market-wise judges can be safely assumed in many transition and 
developing economies. The existence of elites having a clear idea of 
the market probably does not vary substantially among countries. 
However, the role of these elites in government differs with the 
nature of the political system. Such elites may be allowed to lead the 
transition (as in some cases in Asia) or, on the contrary, they may be 
sidestepped by governments acting as mere political agents of ill-
informed voters (as, e.g., in much of Latin America).  
Lastly, if we are correct in considering both legal systems as 
adaptations to local circumstances, our analysis points out the risk 
that the debates on the relative efficiency and performance of 
common and civil law may be sterile and even have a perverse 
consequence. Sterile, because the comparison does not take place 
between viable alternatives. Perverse because, by emphasizing 
differences between common and civil law, this literature may be 
distracting the attention from a much more important issue—what 
seems to be a creeping debasement of the pro-market fundamentals of 
both branches of the Western legal system or, more optimistically, a 
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sort of equilibrium between the efficiency of rational markets and our 
redistributional instincts.  
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